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CANADA UPDATE: PURSUING JUST
DESSERTS: THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA CLARIFIES DAMAGE AWARDS
FOR CHARTER BREACHES
Soji John*
I. INTRODUCTIONWHEN Alan Ward attended a speech by then-Prime Minister
Jean Chr6trien, he had no indication that his actions and those
of the Vancouver Police Department on that day would influ-
ence how Canada now determines monetary damages for breach of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom ("Charter").' On July 23, 2010,
the Supreme Court of Canada in Vancouver (City) v. Ward ruled that
plaintiffs may obtain monetary awards in instances provincial courts had
previously not recognized. 2 In its decision, the "full Court agreed with
most of the findings made in the lower Courts and concluded that if 'ap-
propriate and just', an award of Charter damages may be warranted with-
out proof of bad faith" and laid out a four-part test to determine when
and guide how much damages are available for Charter Breaches.3
II. BACKGROUND
While British laws have provided some judicial guidance in conferring
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2011, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. See Rajan K. Agrawal & Carlo Di Carlo, Canada: Ward v. Vancouver: Putting a
Price on Charter Breaches, MONDAQ, July 30, 2010, http://www.mondaq.com/ca-
nada/article.asp?articleid=106738; Jim Young, Vancouver (City) v. Ward
(2010)-Damages for Breach of Charter Rights, CTrR. CONSIUIONAL SruIEs, U.
ALBERTA, July 28, 2010, http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ccs/rulings/vancover
(city)v.ward.php.
2. See Sara Law, When Will Damages be a Just and Appropriate Remedy for Breach
of Human Rights?, HUMAN Ricros L. RES. 0TR. (2010), http://www.hrlrc.org.au/
court-tribunal/canadian-court-or-tribunal/city-of-vancouver-v-ward-201 0-scc-27-
23-july-2010 (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
3. Tamar Agopian, S.C.C. Awards Charter Damages in the Absence of Bad Faith,
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human rights,4 Canada rejected a formal bill of rights at its founding.5
The role of federal courts was simply to determine jurisdictional issues
when constitutional freedoms were implicated. 6 As the need for a formal
statement of individual rights became evident, Canada attempted to add
a bill of rights through legislation since amending its constitution was dif-
ficult because "any changes. . .had to be passed by the British Parliament
in London."7 In 1960, the legislature enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights
which suffered from its lack of fundamental authority, being subordinate
to the constitution and only applying to federal laws.8 Because of these
limitations, the federal government, along with nine of the ten provinces,
"called on the British Parliament to patriate the constitution to Canada."
Finally, Queen Elizabeth II signed the Canada Act containing the Consti-
tution Act on April 17, 1982, bringing the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms into force.10
The Charter provides individual protections that are in many ways sim-
ilar to the U.S. Bill of Rights." For example, Section 8 of the Charter
corresponds with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Arti-
cle VI of the U.S. Bill of Rights) and provides Canadians with security
from unreasonable searches and seizures.12 But, unlike the U.S. Bill of
Rights, which must rely on external statutes and common law such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens actions, to supply civil remedies, Section 24(1) of
the Charter provides for enforcement of its "guaranteed rights and free-
doms." 13 This section provides that "[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms,
as guaranteed by [the] Charter [of Rights and Freedom], have been in-
fringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances." 1 4
It turns out that Vancouver police violated Alan Ward's Charter free-
4. See Lloyd Duhaime, Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1981), DUHAIME BLOG
(Mar. 22,2010), http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/CanadianLegalHistory/Law
Article-583/1981-Charter-of-Rights-and-Freedoms.aspx.
5. See Charter of Rights and Freedoms, CANADA's RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISToRY,
http://www.historyofrights.com/events/charter.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See The History of the Charter, FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: THE CHARTER OF
RIGIHTS AND FREEDOMs, http://www.charterofrights.calen/26 00-01 (last visited
Nov. 19, 2010).
9. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 5.
10. Along with amending the Constitution to include the Charter, the 1982 Canada
Act also allowed Canada to more easily amend its Constitution in the future. See
The History of the Charter, supra note 8.
11. See Larry Glasser, The American Exclusionary Rule Debate: Looking to England
and Canada for Guidance, 35 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 159, 168 (2003).
12. Compare Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Part I § 8, with U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV.
13. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), § 24.
14. Id. § 24 (1).
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doms when they arrested him in August 2002.15 As a result of the arrest,
Ward "brought an action in tort and for the breach of his human rights"
as protected by Charter § 24(1).16 While the Supreme Court of British
Columbia found that Ward failed to prove any tortious violations, the
Court did find a breach of his Charter rights, albeit in "the absence of a
commission of a tort, bad faith, abuse of power, negligence, or wilful
blindness on the part of the corrections officers."17 This ruling was con-
troversial because prior case law held that when discretionary terms in a
statute are applied to find a violation of Charter rights, the plaintiff is
required to prove mala fides for compensation.' 8 The British Columbia
Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's ruling, resulting in conflict
across the provinces as to whether a bad faith action is required for mon-
etary damages.19 The Supreme Court of Canada found that bad faith is
not a requirement for awarding monetary damages for Charter breaches;
Section 24(1) of the Charter allows the trial judge sufficient discretion to
determine the proper remedy.20 The court also expounded on a four-step
process to determine the proper context and appropriate amount of mon-
etary damages under Section 24(1).21
III. THE PIE, THE ARREST, AND THE STRIP SEARCH
On August 1, 2002, Ward attended an outdoor ceremony at which then
Prime Minister Chrdtrien "was present to mark the opening of a gate to
the entrance of Vancouver's Chinatown." 22 During the ceremony, the lo-
cal police received a report that someone was intent on throwing a pie at
the Prime Minister, an event that had happened in the recent past.2 3 The
description of the would-be culprit matched those of Ward in some re-
spects-a white male wearing a t-shirt with red writing. But, the main
reason he aroused suspicion was that he appeared to be running away
from a police officer in approximately the same location where the culprit
was reported.24 Ward, a lawyer with a reputation for defending political
protesters, claimed he was running towards the Prime Minister's location
15. See generally Renn A. Holness, Vancouver Police Forced to Pay for Unreasonable
Strip Search, BRITISH COILOM1IA PERSONAL INJURY L. BiLoG (July 26, 2010; 9:43
AM), http://www.holnesslawgroup.com/blog/2010/07/26/vancouver-police-forced-
to-pay-for-unreasonable-strip-search.
16. Law, supra note 2.
17. Christine Kellowan, One Order ofJust Desserts, Hold the Mala Fides Requirement,
TiH CouRr, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.thecourt.ca/2009/09/30/one-order-of-just-
desserts-hold-the-mala-fides-requirement (quoting the trial judge in the British
Columbia Supreme Court decision).
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See Mike Novakowski, Charter Breaches Net Arrestee Cash, BLUE LINE MAG.
(Oct. 2010), available at http://blueline.calarticles/charterbreaches-net-arrestee_
cash.
21. Id.
22. Law, supra note 2.
23. See Ward v. Vancouver (City), 2007 BCSC 3, [2007] 63 B.C.L.R. (4th) 399 para. 2
(Can. B.C.).
24. See id. para. 7.
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because he wanted to get a better view of a demonstrator being accosted
by "men in sUits." 2 5
What likely began as a misunderstanding escalated as Ward vocifer-
ously protested his detainment. 26 The local media, alerted by the com-
motion, filmed part of his arrest.27 Ward was taken to the jail where a
constable filled out the arrest report indicating that the arrest was for
breach of peace and that Ward was also being held pending an investiga-
tion into assault on the Prime Minister. 28 Following a brief stay in the
holding cell, Ward was stripped all the way to his underwear and
searched, at which point he protested; the sergeant in charge authorized a
deviation from the strip search policy and "the balance of the strip was
not conducted." 29 The police released Ward roughly four and a half
hours after his initial arrest and several hours after the Prime Minister
left the area.30 Upon his release, Ward was taken by police detectives to
the police compound where they had stored his seized car.31
IV. AT THE TRIAL COURT
Ward brought claims for violation of Sections 7-9 of his Charter rights
as well as in tort for assault, battery, and false imprisonment against the
police officers, the City of Vancouver, and the British Columbia Provin-
cial Government, which was in charge of the jail.3 2 He also brought neg-
ligence claims against the City of Vancouver and the Provincial
Government.33 The trial court found that because his initial detention
was not arbitrary, but rather for investigative purposes, his Charter rights
were not violated by the initial detention. 34 The court also found that the
officers who arrested and handcuffed Ward did not commit assault or bat-
tery because they had "reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Ward may
attempt to escape" and were entitled to take him into custody.35 But, the
trial court found that Ward was unlawfully imprisoned for three and a
half to four hours after the Prime Minister left the ceremony, thus violat-
ing his right to be free from arbitrary detainment and imprisonment
under Section 9 of the Charter.36 The Court relied on R. v. Mann,37
which found that an investigative detention must be reasonably brief; oth-
erwise, it can become a de facto arrest.38 The Court also found that be-
25. Id. paras. 4, 7. Upon conducting a search, the authorities failed to find any desserts
on Mr. Ward. Id. para. 63.
26. See id. paras. 20, 22.
27. See id. para. 33.
28. See id.
29. Id. para. 28.
30. Id. para. 32.
31. Id.
32. See id. para. 35.
33. Id.
34. See id. para. 52.
35. See id. para. 56, 65.
36. Id. para. 71.
37. See id. para. 52.
38. See R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, para. 35 (Can.).
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cause the officers did not commit willful misconduct in holding Mr. Ward
for the extra time, they were protected under § 20 of the Police Act from
personal liability. 39 Finally, because of a lack of duty and a lack of evi-
dence on the standard of care, the Court found no negligence. 4 0
With regards to the strip search, the Court relied on R. v. Golden,41
where the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that strip searches must be
conducted to limit the interference of privacy of the person and the need
for a strip search must be determined on a "case-by-case basis and cannot
justify routine strip searches of all arrestees." 42 In this case, as in R. v.
Douglas, a reasonable strip search policy does not subject all detainees to
an examination, regardless of whether they are charged with an offense
or not.4 3 The trial court determined that because Ward did not display
any "threat to the safety and security of the Jail," was being detained for
only a short period of time, and the strip search was conducted contrary
to the correction Branch's stated policy, it resulted in a breach of his § 8
rights under the Charter.44 Further, because he was not arrested for as-
sault or attempted assault, the seizure of Mr. Ward's vehicle constituted
unreasonable seizure, which also was a breach of his § 8 Charter rights.45
In summary, while the Court did find that Mr. Ward's rights under the
Charter were breached, they also found that the violation was without
any malice, bad faith, or accompanying tort.46
In arguing against an award of damages for Charter breaches absent a
tort, the Provincial Government relied fundamentally upon Mackin v.
New Brunswick, which held that "absent conduct that is clearly wrong, in
bad faith, or an abuse of power," damages should not be granted for
claims against actions that are valid under a statute that is later declared
unconstitutional.47 The Provincial Government also relied on Wynberg v.
Ontario, where the Ontario Appellate Court declared a government pol-
icy decision, in which only autistic children between the ages of two to
five had access to behavior intervention programs, an unconstitutional
breach of older autistic children's Charter rights.48 In Wynberg, the On-
tario Appeals Court had relied on Mackin to limit the availability of mon-
etary damages.49
But, the Ward Trial Court found that unlike Wynberg, which resulted in
a declaration of unconstitutionality of the policy as the remedy, in this
case, the strip search policy was sound; rather, it was the application of
the policy resulting from poor discretion of the officers that violated
39. Ward, 2007 BSC 3, para. 97, 103-04.
40. See id. para. 96.
41. See id. para. 73.
42. R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, para. 97 (Can.).
43. See Ward, 2007 BCSC 3, para. 80.
44. Id. para. 86.
45. See id. para. 92.
46. Id. para. 105.
47. Mackin v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, para. 78 (Can.).
48. See Wynberg v. Ontario, [2006] 269 D.L.R. (4th) 435, para. 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
49. See id. paras. 192-193.
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Ward's Charter § 8 rights.50 The Court then relied on several lower court
decisions providing damages for Charter violations.5'
In determining the amount of damages for the strip search, the court
considered awards from cases in similar situations-those without egre-
gious conduct. 52 Because the strip search was relatively benign-his un-
derwear remained on-and because of the lack of physical or
psychological damage, the court awarded a relatively low amount of
$5,000.53 For the unreasonable seizure of his vehicle, the court awarded
Mr. Ward $100.54
The British Columbia Appellate Court dismissed all appeals by Mr.
Ward, the City of Vancouver, and the Provincial Government.55 The City
of Vancouver appealed the $100 award for unreasonable seizure of Mr.
Ward's car while the Provincial Government appealed the $5,000 award
for the unreasonable strip search. 56 The appellate court found that con-
trary to the Province's argument, Mackin was not directly on point;
rather, there were no appellate cases that discuss damage awards for a
good-faith breach of Charter rights.57 The appellate court relied on Dou-
cet-Bourdreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) where the Supreme
Court of Canada promoted an expansive reading of the remedies availa-
ble under § 24(1) for Charter breaches.58 The court concluded that a
Charter breach resulting in striking down a statute is fundamentally dif-
ferent from one that results when a government actor improperly applies
a valid law. 5 9 In the former case, the declaration of a law as invalid pro-
vides immediate relief for a person previously subject to that law; but, in
the latter case, a mere declaration of application as invalid, though offer-
ing vindication, provides no substantial compensation to the injured
party.60
The dissent argued that because the officers did not properly apply the
policy, through "an honest but mistaken belief.. .as to the correct search
procedure," there should be no damages.6' The dissent contended that
damages would not accomplish any corrective result greater than that of a
mere declaration; that damages should not result from public officials'
actions without malice or bad faith, especially when considering the effect
50. See Ward, 2007 BCSC 3, para. 109.
51. Id. para. 111.
52. Id. paras. 125-127.
53. Id.
54. Id. para. 129.
55. Ward v. Vancouver (City), 2009 BCCA 23, [2009] 89 B.C.L.R. (4th) 217, para. 71
(Can. B.C. C.A.)
56. Id. paras. 29 & 34.
57. Id. para. 49.
58. In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), the violation was
improper application of language rights under § 23 of the Charter. See id. para. 60
(citing Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, para. 52 (Can.)).
59. Id. para. 62.
60. Id. paras. 62-63.
61. Id. para. 82.
PURSUING JUST DESSERTS
on the public's purse; and that without bad faith, the resultant award
would create the unnecessary aura of strict liability.62
V. AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada in hearing Ward v. Vancouver (City) has
taken a substantial step in developing the law regarding the availability of
monetary damages under § 24(1) of the Charter.63 In its unanimous deci-
sion, the Court detailed a four-step process to determine conditions for
providing damages and "emphasized the overriding principle of the
phrase 'appropriate and just' contained in [§ 24 (l)]."64 The Court
stressed that § 24(1) allows many remedies of which damages is but one,
and that a court must exercise its discretion as per the facts of the case to
determine the appropriate remedy.65 The Court characterized an appro-
priate and just remedy for Charter breaches as being one that:
(1) meaningfully vindicatefs] the rights and freedoms of the claim-
ants; (2) employ[s] means that are legitimate within the framework
of. . .[Canada's] constitutional democracy; (3).. .[is] a judicial rem-
edy which vindicates the right while invoking the function and pow-
ers of a court; and (4). . .[is] fair to the party against whom the order
is made.66
It is under this rubric that the Court expounded its "four-part test [or
four-step test] for assessing when it would be appropriate and just to
award damages." 67
As the first step of the test, the Court necessitated that the plaintiff
must "establish a Charter breach." 68 With this threshold requirement
met, the second step is to determine the basis on which damages provide
the appropriate remedy for this breach of his Charter rights.69 The Court
maintained that the awarding of damages must be useful either in the
function of: (1) "compensation" to attempt to make the victim whole; (2)
''vindication" to promote and uphold the importance of Charter rights; or
(3) "deterrence" to prevent the future breach of Charter rights.70 For
compensation, the Court allowed consideration of both physical and psy-
chological harm to the victim.7' Because Charter rights implicate con-
cerns involving not only the immediate victim for whom compensation is
62. See id. paras. 84-90. Moreover, the dissent argued that the damages remedy under
§ 24(1) for Charter breaches was underdeveloped. Id. para. 83.
63. See generally Ward v. Vancouver (City), 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 321 D.L.R. (4th) 1
(Can.).
64. Agopian, supra note 3, at 2.
65. See id.
66. Holness, supra note 15.
67. Agrawal & Di Carlo, supra note 1.
68. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 23.
69. See Arnold Ceballos, Top Court Upholds Novel Charter Remedy for Lawyer's Strip
Search, LAw. WKLY, Aug. 6, 2010, available at http://www.lawyersweekly.calindex.
php?section=article&articleid=1217.
70. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, paras. 24-25.
71. Id. para. 27.
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the primary focus, the court also considers vindication in order to pre-
vent harm to "the state and to society" from the erosion of Charter
rights.72 Thus, the first and second tests focus on to the "need for com-
pensation" and "the appropriateness of an award of damages."73
The third test determines whether the State presents sufficient justifica-
tion of the breach through "countervailing factors" such that it over-
whelms the results of the second test.74 The Court acknowledged that
countervailing factors is a developing area of law, but listed two primary
considerations that could result in justifying the breach: "the existence of
alternative remedies and [the] concern for good governance."75 The
Court proposed, for example, that if the function of the damage was only
compensation and if a tort remedy was available, then it may be appropri-
ate to forgo damages under § 24(1).76 A court can also consider that
good governance may dictate that the breach must be of a "minimum
threshold of gravity" before damages are allowed.77 For example, in
Mackin, properly complying with existing statutes in good faith was a rea-
son to provide some immunity for the government, such that a declara-
tion without monetary damages was the appropriate remedy.78 Finally,
the Court suggested that principles from private tort law can serve as a
guide to develop this area of the law.7 9
The fourth step, if the basis for a damage award outweighs the counter-
vailing factors, is in assessing the damage amount in a method that is
"appropriate and just."80 "The objects of compensation, vindication, and
deterrence will determine the amount of damages awarded" with com-
pensation playing the primary role.8' Tort law should again serve to
guide a court in determining the compensatory damages.82 But, the
Court declared that fairness to the State must also be considered because
large awards that divert public funds may be inappropriate. 3 In general,
the lower courts, thus far, have been reluctant to award large damages
and with this holding, this practice is expected to continue. 84
The existence of a Charter breach was not appealed to the Supreme
Court, so Ward satisfied the first step of the four part test.85 In applying
the second step, the Court found that the strip search was a serious in-
fringement of his Charter rights, while the seizure of his car did not cause
72. Id. paras. 28-29.
73. Id. para. 30.
74. Novakowski, supra note 20.
75. Id.
76. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 34.
77. Novakowski, supra note 20.
78. See generally Ward, 2010 SCC 27, paras. 39-40.
79. See Ceballos, supra note 69 (quoting Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 22).
80. See Novakowski, supra note 20 (quoting Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 46).
81. Id. (quoting Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 47).
82. See Ward, 2010 SCC 27, paras. 49-51.
83. See id. para. 53.
84. See Agopian, supra note 3.
85. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 62.
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him compensable damages. 86 Because the tort action did not stand-the
state could not show alternative remedies-and because the state could
not show that an award would be contrary to good governance, a damage
award was in order.87 Finally, in the fourth step, the Supreme Court
agreed with the trial judge's finding that the monetary damage should be
modest because of the limited violation of his privacy and because vindi-
cation and deterrence do not require a large award.88
VI. 42 U.S.C. § 1893 AND BIVENS ACTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES
In its determination of the proper functions of damage awards, the Su-
preme Court of Canada considered the United States' judicially available
remedies for constitutional violations presented in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents.89 In Bivens, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed monetary
damage awards as a remedy against federal agents who violated a private
citizen's constitutional rights.90 In this first consideration of a federal
cause of action, the Court determined that the plaintiff's Fourth Amend-
ment protection from unreasonable searches and seizure was violated by
federal agents who entered his apartment without a warrant, conducted a
search, and then arrested him for drug offenses. 91 Similar to the Cana-
dian Supreme Court, the Bivens Court recognized the primarily compen-
satory nature of damage awards, but also emphasized the vindication
effect of substantiating constitutional rights.92 Because of the more de-
veloped case law and analogous rights available in the United States, the
Canadian Supreme Court considered U.S. court decisions regarding mon-
etary remedies for constitutional breach.93
Because Mr. Ward's claims were primarily against provincial and local
agents, the Court could also have considered 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the U.S.
federal law which allows plaintiffs to bring a cause of action against state
and local officials and local governments who, under color of state or
local law, cause "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution." 9 4 "In Monroe v. Pape, the [Supreme] Court
ruled that a plaintiff could state a claim for damages under § 1983 against
86. See id. para. 77; Novakowski, supra note 20.
87. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 68.
88. See id. para. 72.
89. See id. para. 27 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
90. See Heather J. Hanna & Alan G. Harding, Ubi Jus Ibi Jus Ibi Remedium-For the
Violation of Every Right, There Must Be a Remedy: The Supreme Court's Refusal
to Use the Bivens Remedy in Wilkie v. Robbins, 8 Wyo. L. REV. 193, 199 (2008).
91. Id. at 199-200.
92. Id. at 201.
93. See Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 33, 72.
94. See Donald L. Nevins Ill, Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Failing to
Equip Police with Tasers, 28 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 225, 247 (2009) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
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local officials" for an illegal search.95
While local governments and local officials may be sued for damages
under § 1983, only injunctive relief is available from state governments
and state officers acting in their official capacity. 96 Moreover, in the
United States damages may be unavailable from state or local officials
without first overcoming the safe harbor of good faith belief and reasona-
ble conduct through the qualified immunity doctrine for government offi-
cials acting in their individual capacities. 97 Thus, without bad faith or
malice, damage awards are only available from local officers.98
As a result, if Mr. Ward's situation were presented to a federal court in
the United States, the damages available from a Canadian provincial gov-
ernment might not be available from the analogous state government,
although declaratory relief likely would.99 At the local level, barring bad
faith, the officers themselves would be protected by qualified immunity,
similar to the result in Canada.100 Further, in order for a city to be liable,
under § 1983, the plaintiff would have to "show a causal link between
execution of the [challenged] policy" and the injury from the strip
search.10' Thus, upon showing that the strip search or seizure is a custom
or practice "that results in a deprivation of federal rights," a damage rem-
edy would be available at the local level.102
The Canadian Supreme Court's willingness to consider foreign case law
in setting the framework for remedies for Charter breaches'03 not only
provides some validation of foreign legal standards and their application,
but may encourage Canadian lower courts to do the same when develop-
ing the particularities of Canada's law in the varied cases in which these
claims will be asserted. Indeed, where human rights are concerned, mod-
ern courts have turned "to other nations for guidance." 104 In those situa-
tions where countries face similar problems and where they have
95. John Stanfield Buford, When the Heck Does This Claim Accrue? Heck v.
Humphrey's Footnote Seven and § 1983 Damages Suits for Illegal Search and
Seizure, 58 WASH. & LEE L. Rt-v. 1493, 1496-97 (2001) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 385
U.S. 167, 187 (1961)).
96. See Michael S. Gilmore, An Introduction to Liability and Immunities Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 51 ADVOC. (loA 10) 17 (Oct. 2008).
97. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, 97 ii. B.J. 156, 158 (2009).
See also Nicole B. Lieberman, Post-Johnson v. Jones Confusion: The Granting of
Back-Door Qualified Immunity, 6 B.U. Pun. INT. L.J. 567, 568-69 (1997).
98. See Gilmore, supra note 96.
99. See id.
100. See Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 97-113.
101. Ellis v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 1996 WL 683868, at *2 (E.D. Pa.) (citing Losch
v. Borough of Parksburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984)).
102. Nevins, supra note 94, at 249.
103. See Ward, 2010 SCC 27, para. 27.
104. While there are differing opinions on the subject and the United States seems to
overwhelmingly reject foreign analysis, Justice Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme
Court believes that "the Supreme Court can learn from other... [international
bodies and foreign jurisdictions], particularly in human rights matters." Jean M.
Callighan, "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind. . . ": Selected Speeches
by Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court on Foreign and International Law, 36 Isrr'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 181, 182-3 (2008) (book review).
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espoused similar values, as in this case,105 "transnational judicial ex-
changes" may serve as an efficient method to provide direction.106 Be-
cause there has been considerable legal analysis regarding U.S. decisions
concerning damages for both § 1983 and Bivens actions and regarding
affirmative defenses for constitutional violations and because of Canada's
willingness to consider U.S. law, it is likely that Canadian lower courts
could turn to American decisions for guidance. 107 In the end, it is not
only the Canadian legal system that benefits from adopting this transna-
tional approach but also the countries whose laws are being analyzed as
they will profit from external scrutiny. 08
VII. CONCLUSION
The Canadian Supreme Court has unanimously held that damages are
an available remedy for Charter breaches to compensate the plaintiff,
vindicate the applicable Charter right, and deter future violations, barring
countervailing factors. 109 The Court presented a methodology to follow
in assessing violations to determine the applicability of monetary dam-
ages and the amount of damages.1 10 Because the Court considered for-
eign remedies to similar breaches of constitutional rights, the ruling is
predominantly consistent with the damages remedy for similar violations
in the United States. This decision by the Court seems to resolve contra-
dictory provisional laws regarding the requirement of bad faith for dam-
age awards for Charter breaches.'11 But Ward v. Vancouver only sets the
stage for future case law that will further clarify the test. Until this hap-
pens, because of the broad discretion allowed to courts, as is needed in
such fact intensive cases, "uncertainty [in administering the new method-
ology] will be amplified for the next few years as courts grapple with hav-
ing to apply what is a new legal analysis.""12
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